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Military Discipline

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With China’s ongoing high-profile anti-graft campaign now well into its second year, the regular announcement of the fall of senior officials has made such stories less and less sensational. Despite this, many were still surprised when, on January 15, China’s Ministry of Defense published a list of 16 high ranking PLA officers who had fallen under investigation for alleged corruption in 2014.

Other than Gu Junshan, Deputy Director of the General Logistics Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (the first major military figure to fall in 2014), and Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), it was the first time that the public had been made aware of investigations into ten of the 16 names on this list.

Then, on January 29, the PLA Daily, official newspaper of China’s armed forces, reported that 200 senior PLA officers had been reprimanded, demoted or removed from their posts for reasons related to corruption as a result of an audit of 4,024 officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel or above, including 82 generals.

For a long period of time, the PLA, which maintains its own internal legal system independent of the civilian courts, has enjoyed immunity from public scrutiny. Although a consensus has emerged among experts and the public that the problem of corruption, already endemic throughout China’s public institutions, is equally serious, if not more so, within the PLA, military officers snared by the Party’s crackdown have received comparatively little publicity.

It is unprecedented for China’s secretive military to announce an investigation into senior military officers in such a high-profile manner. Observers believe that this publicity indicates a major policy shift regarding how the leadership will handle corruption and other legal issues within the military.

discipline

“The anti-graft campaign within the PLA is an integral component of national anti-corruption efforts,” Hou Xiaohe, a senior colonel and a strategy expert with the PLA’s National Defense University, told NewsChina.

A major sign of the expansion and strengthening of the anti-graft campaign has been the revitalization of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CMC (CMCCDI).

Despite being the military equivalent of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the CMCCDI has far less power and independence from other military agencies in terms of its relationship with other Party organs.

Within the PLA’s internal power structure, the CMCCDI is subject to the General Political Department of the PLA, with the CMCCDI’s head outranked by incumbent heads of many other military agencies. The current CMCCDI chief, Du Jincai, for example, is not even a member of the CMC.

In recent months, however, the CMCCDI has become increasingly active. It was previously reported by Xinhua News Agency that the CMCCDI had sent three working groups to conduct inspections of all seven of China’s military districts between December of 2013 and the end of 2014.

Earlier, in November 2014, the CMC placed the Auditing Office, previously administered by the PLA General Logistics Department, under its direct control. As this body has spearheaded the auditing of various departments and districts, resulting in the fall of 200 senior officers, it is believed that the PLA Auditing Office has been cooperating with the CMCCDI on its tours of inspection, and is very likely to be officially placed under the administration of the CMCCDI in the coming months.

The fact that, for the first time in decades, CMCCDI members attended the CCDI’s annual working conference, which concluded in January, indicates that the PLA may soon become a major focus of the anti-graft campaign.

Rule by Law

Besides strengthened anti-corruption efforts within the military, the central leadership has also outlined a grander vision to extend its national “rule-by-law” agenda to the PLA.

In the past two years, the senior Party leadership has highlighted the importance of improving the application of Chinese military law in the CPC’s third and fourth plenary sessions held in 2013 and 2014.

At the Fourth Plenum decision, the leadership called for “reform of the military justice system and the establishment of unified procedures for military prosecution and trials.”

In October 2014, Ding Xiangrong, one of the named contributors to the formal text of this decision released at the Fourth Plenum, was appointed head of the CMC’s Legislative Affairs Commission, the military equivalent of the State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office. After assuming his position, Ding’s office released a legal policy guide which identified a variety of problems said to have led to corruption within the military.

Following the Fourth Plenum, the PLA’s internal judiciary C the PLA Military Court and the PLA Military Procuratorate C appear to have gained more executive powers. Immediately after the Fourth Plenum concluded in November 2014, Major General Li Xiaofeng, President of the PLA’s Military Procuratorate, was promoted from the rank of army commander to the rank of deputy military district commander. In the same month, two additional vice presidencies were created for the PLA Military Court. Then on January 14, 2015, one day prior to the military releasing its list of fallen generals, official media announced that Major General Liu Jixing, president of the PLA Military Court, had received the same promotion as Li Xiaofeng.

These promotions and appointments have been linked to upcoming trials of the high ranking PLA officers named in the military’s official list.

In December 2014, 37 senior military officers, including Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang, vice chairmen of the CMC and de facto deputy commander of the PLA, and China’s current defense minister Chang Wanquan, co-authored a series of articles in China Military Law, the official magazine of the the CMC’s Legislative Affairs Commission, to advocate the concept of “rule [of] the PLA by law.”

In an interview with China National Radio on January 27, Wang Haiping, a senior colonel and head of the Department of Military Law at the PLA Xi’an College of Politics highlighted some of the developments that Chinese military legal experts have been advocating.

Wang argued that China’s leaders should implement a law to govern both branches of the military judiciary, and highlighted the need for transparency in military courts. Wang also advocated full public access to military court cases unrelated to military secrets. Perhaps most surprisingly, Wang even stated that the PLA Military Court and the PLA Military Procuratorate should be made subject to the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China’s highest civilian judicial authorities.

It is unclear to what extent Wang’s comments, perhaps the first made in public by a military official regarding reform of the military’s legal system, reflect the intentions of the central leadership. Given the abundant media coverage of the investigations into Gu Junshan and Xu Caihou, and other investigations into senior military officers, there are signs that the leadership is gradually lifting the veil of censorship surrounding China’s military.

For many observers, recent developments regarding the military justice system are both a part of broader rule-by-law initiatives and a component of the Party’s stated overall strategy to build a powerful military and a strong nation.

According to Hou Xiaohe, the strategy expert, corruption inside the PLA has undermined morale and combat readiness throughout China’s armed forces. Given the status of China’s military, which includes the world’s largest standing army and boasts a significant nuclear arsenal, China will need to establish a sound legal framework and a robust internal legal system if the Party is to effectively govern the armed forces.

But for Zhang Junshe, a senior researcher with the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute, as with the rule-by-law initiatives currently being rolled out in China’s civilian sector, the key to the success of any reform of the military justice system will be implementation.