可错论的合理证明与碰巧为真的运气
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[摘要]
葛梯尔问题是如何解决知识论上存在的悖论的问题，并非仅仅是寻找第四条件的问题；葛梯尔问题的实质在于可错论的合理证明与运气的结合，而非仅仅是推理的前提有误，更非语词的误用。可错论的合理证明始终会为信念之碰巧为真保留一定的可能性，运气使这种可能性成为现实；可错论的合理证明原则不可废，否则，怀疑论将不可避免，因此，消除运气的影响就成了解决葛梯尔问题的关键。
[关键词] 可错论； 合理证明； 运气； 葛梯尔问题； 敏感性； 安全性； 知识论
Fallibilist Justification and Veritic Epistemic Luck： The Essence
of Gettier Problem and Misunderstandings in It
Wen Xueping
（School of Marxism， Southwest University of Political Science & Law， Chongqing 401120， China）
Abstract：
More than half a century ago， the American philosopher Edmund Gettier proposed two classic counterexamples against the traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge. These counterexamples have brought a great problem for the definition of knowledge， which is called ″the Gettier problem.″ There has been endless debate among epistemologists about how to understand and solve it and a lot of misunderstandings of that problem have thus arisen.
Firstly， the Gettier problem has been narrowly interpreted by some epistemologists as the problem of searching for a fourth condition that has to add to the justifiedtruebelief definition of propositional knowledge. In fact， the the Gettier problem aims to solve the paradox in epistemology which can be shown in the following three propositions： （1） Knowledge is justified true belief； （2） S has a justified true belief p； （3） S does not know that p. These three propositions can not be true at the same time because they are inconsistent. To solve this paradox， you can partly or completely deny any one or two of those three propositions. Searching for the fourth condition is but one of the many proposed approaches to the Gettier problem.
Secondly， some epistemologists think that the Gettier problem results from the false premise of deduction， which directly leads to the nofalse premise solution （NFPS） to the problem. NFPS can either be strict or moderate. As a strong advocate of strict NFPS， the Chinese epistemologist Chen Jiaming interprets epistemic justification as ″verification，″ and then views Gettiers counterexample of the tencoin case not as an epistemic case but as the case of misusage of words. In fact， the strict NFPS is a disguised form of infallibilism which directly results in skepticism while the proponents of the moderate NFPS fail to make clear the meaning of ″essentially″ in the condition that ″Ss justification for p does not essentially depend on any false premise.″ The failure of NFPS arises from the misconception about the fundamental structure of the Gettier problem， which is a combination of fallibilist justification and veritic epistemic luck. Fallibilist justification may cause the justifiers of proposition to separate from the facts asserted by the proposition. That is to say， the justifiers of proposition are inconsistent with its truthmaker， which will usually induce a falsehood. But the good luck called ″veritic epistemic luck″ makes you magically avoid the falsehood and get the truth. In order to solve the Gettier problem， we should eliminate either the inconsistency between justifier and truthmaker or the effect of veritic epistemic luck. But you cannot eliminate the inconsistency completely； otherwise you will get into infallibilism. So it is a preponderant solution to the Gettier problem to eliminate the effect of veritic epistemic luck by means of the condition of ″safety.″
Finally， some epistemologists think that knowledge can be lucky， which means that the epistemic agents in Gettiers counterexamples actually know the target propositions instead of not knowing. The claim is based on the idea that knowledge varies in degree. Lucky knowledge is at the edge of ″knowing，″ but it is still ″knowing″ instead of ″not knowing.″ This argument hardly holds water because it begs the question. It is the case that knowledge is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck， but it is not the case that knowledge is incompatible with all kinds of luck. Furthermore， it is our universal intuition and daytoday practice that knowledge excludes veritic epistemic luck.
Key words： fallibilism； justification； luck； the Gettier Problem； sensitivity； safety； epistemology
葛梯尔1963年发表了经典论文《有合理证明的真信念就是知识吗》见E.Gettier， ″Is Justified True Belief Knowledge？″ Analysis， Vol.23， No.6（1963）， pp.12123。“Justified”一词国内主要有三种译法，即“证实了的”（胡军译）、“有确证的”（陈嘉明译）和“得到辩护的”（陈真译）；“justification”也就相应地译为“证实”、“确证”、“辩护”。“证实”和“确证”的译法看似很专业，实则欠妥。其原因有三个：（1）认知上的“justification”表明的是知识的评价性要素、价值要素，而非仅仅是描述性要素或事实要素，而“确证”或“证实”不容易被理解为价值评价，因为“命题p已经被证实了还是没有被证实（已经被确证了还是没有被确证）”，这更像是一个事实描述的问题，而非价值评价的问题。（2）认知上的“justification”有“可错论”（fallibilism）和“不可错论”（infallibilism）之分，而“确证”或“证实”容易让人想到“justification”一定是不可错的，“命题p是被证实了的（或确证了的），但p有可能是错的”，这话听起来是自相矛盾的，其原因就在于人们习惯于自觉地将“证实”或“确证”作不可错论的理解：p既然是被证实了的（或确证了的），那么它就不可能是错的。“命题p是得到合理证明的，但它仍然有可能是错的”，这话听起来并不自相矛盾，原因在于“合理证明”与可错论是可以相容的，当然也可以对“合理证明”作不可错论的理解。（3）认知上的“justification”是要表明信念的合理性，而非行为的合理性，人们习惯于将“辩护”理解成为行为提供合理性证明，而且“辩护”也不大容易被理解为知识/知道所具有的价值因素。我国台湾地区学者习惯于将“justification”译为“证成”，这同样患有（1）、（2）两项毛病。因此，笔者将“justification”一词译为“合理证明”；与此相对应，“justified”译为“有合理证明的”或“得到合理证明的”，“justify”译为“证明……是合理的”，“justifier”译为“理据”，即理由或证据。这种译法似乎有些笨拙，但有助于避免错误的理解，而且比较生活化，有助于知识论研究的成果被大众所接受。，提出了针对传统知识概念分析的两个反例，这立即引起了西方哲学界经久不衰的研究兴趣，相关的论著可谓汗牛充栋，却又争议不断对于葛梯尔反例所引发的知识论问题，国内学者虽有引介和探讨，但不够细致，更未形成百家争鸣的局面。。之所以如此，是因为葛梯尔揭示了人类认知可能面临的普遍困境。
一、 何谓“葛梯尔问题”
日常意义上的“知识”（knowledge）一词至少有两层意思：一是指作为过程的内在状态，即“知道”（knowing）的状态；二是指认识活动的真理性成果。“知道”的状态必定蕴含着真理性的认知成果；获得真理性认知成果必然蕴含着“知道”的状态。因此，哲学家们对“知识”概念的分析通常就是对“知道”这一意向状态的分析。
知识概念的传统定义是“有合理证明的真信念”（justified true belief）“Belief”一词与“knowledge”一样，有相同类型的过程/结果歧义，既可指一种作为过程的内在的意向状态，即“相信”的状态，也可指作为“相信”之结果的状态，即“信念”。这两层含义也是相互蕴含的，因而经常相互替换。，即S知道p，当且仅当：
（1）p是真的；
（2）S相信p；
（3）S的信念p是有合理证明的。参见E.Gettier， ″Is Justified True Belief Knowledge？″ Analysis， Vol.23， No.6（1963）， p.121。S代表认知主体，p代表命题内容。
这种理解通常被简称为“JTB理论”或“三要素分析”，其来源可追溯到柏拉图的对话参见《美诺篇》（Meno）97e98a（《柏拉图全集》第1卷，王晓朝译，人民出版社2002年版，第532533页）和《泰阿泰德篇》（Theaetetus）201c202d（《柏拉图全集》第2卷，王晓朝译，人民出版社2002年版，第737738页）。。