Shifting Sands
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Given China’s rising international influence and its vital interests in the region， the nation’s diplomatic position in the various conflicts of the Middle East has become a focal point for international attention， especially after Russia began to launch airstrikes in Syria in October， leading to a clash with Turkey over the downing of a Russian aircraft and a further shift in the regional diplomatic landscape.
‘Proactive’
Although China has consistently opposed both the spread of terrorism and externally imposed regime change， a position sympathetic with that of Russia， its leadership has largely kept out of conflicts in the region， making no specific commitments to any involved parties.
In recent months， however， China appears to have suddenly stepped up its diplomatic activities. On December 22， 2015， Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in Beijing， with both men pledging to upgrade their respective countries’ relationship to a “strategic partnership.”
On the same day， China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced at the foreign ministers’ meeting of the International Syria Support Group （ISSG） that China would like to host talks between representatives of the Syrian government and the country’s opposition groups that do not have extremist ties.
Beijing has previously hosted both Syrian government representatives and opposition leaders at different times， but Wang’s offer marked the first time the Chinese government has explicitly offered to facilitate direct talks between the various sides in the Syrian civil war.
The next day， on December 23， both Wang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi held meetings with the Syrian deputy prime minister， also serving concurrently as the country’s foreign minister， Walid al-Moallem. Two weeks later， on January 6， Beijing hosted President Khaled Khoja of the Syrian National Coalition （SNC）.
Whether or not China’s mediation efforts bear fruit， China’s recent diplomatic efforts in Syria have led many to believe that Beijing is ready to take a more proactive position， especially as the regional diplomatic landscape is in flux due to waning US influence and soaring tension between regional powers.
China’s recent diplomatic exchanges with Iraq and Syria have led some to speculate that Beijing is leaning towards the so-called Russia-Syria-Iran-Iraq （RSII） coalition， particularly given seeming commonalities between China’s Middle East position and that of Russia.
Taking Sides？
The fact that Abadi’s visit to China came as the Iraqi prime minister rejected the idea of deploying US ground troops in Iraq and protested Turkish incursions in northern Iraq has further strengthened such speculation.
In an interview with China’s State-controlled Xinhua News Agency， Abadi reiterated criticism of the US-led coalition， which， Abadi said， has not provided adequate support to Iraq in its fight against Islamic State （IS）， and asked for close cooperation with China on security issues. Abadi also repeated his protests against Turkey.
Beijing made no direct response to Abadi’s criticism of the US-led coalition and Turkey. In the joint statement issued by China and Iraq， Beijing pledged to support “Iraq’s unity， territorial integrity， sovereignty and independence” and mutual efforts “to maintain national security， stability and to fight against terrorism，” but offered no specific commitments to the Iraqi government other than limited personnel training and humanitarian aid.
Earlier in October， the Iraqi defense ministry released a video showing the launch of a Chinese-made CH-4B combat drone， which the Iraqi defense minister， speaking during the broadcast， said took off for its first combat action against IS militants in Iraq. While analysts believe that China may have increased its arms sales to Iraq， material support is mainly targeted at increasing the Iraqi government’s capabilities in fighting IS， particularly in defense of its remaining oil fields， a vital source of imports for China. In August of last year， Iraq emerged as the third-biggest supplier of oil to China， and energy cooperation has been a major focus of relations between Beijing and Baghdad.
So far， there is little evidence that China will begin actively taking sides in the increasingly complicated conflicts and tensions in the Middle East. Even with this more proactive approach， Beijing has been treading carefully to avoid being dragged into disputes between major regional powers.
On the Syria issue， China and Russia have vetoed four previous UN Security Council resolutions insisting on President Bashar alAssad’s removal as a precondition for peace talks. Other than that， however， Beijing has largely taken a back seat as Russia， the West， and other regional powers have competed for influence.
Beijing’s mediation initiative， announced only after the UN Security Council reached consensus on December 18 and endorsed a road map for a peace process that did not require Assad to step down， also follows the same prudent approach， avoiding direct conflict with the interests of other major powers.
More recently， in the aftermath of a diplomatic fallout as Saudi Ara- bia and its regional allies severed diplomatic relations with Iran， Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying announced that China had sent the country’s vice foreign minister Zhang Ming to both Saudi Arabia and Iran for “an exchange of views” on the regional situation in an effort to ease tensions.
Stability
As the Middle East remains the primary source of China’s crude oil imports， stability in the region has been a top priority for China. Without the colonial burden of other major powers， Beijing has enjoyed solid ties with almost all major regional players. Russia， Turkey， Saudi Arabia and Iran are among the founding members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB）， one of the few international bodies in which all four nations are members.
While Russia has become one of China’s closest partners in the past couple of years， Turkey has also been named a key component of China’s One Belt， One Road initiative. The first overseas high-speed railway project built by Chinese companies was completed in Turkey in 2014. Although alleged Turkish involvement in smuggling ethnic Uyghurs out of China and anti-Chinese protests in Istanbul in 2015 have dampened the enthusiasm of their respective governments， China and Turkey reiterated in November their commitment to continue to push forward the One Belt， One Road initiative during the G20 summit held in Antalya， Turkey.
In response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet， China’s official position has been that the incident was “a loss to the anti-terrorist efforts of the international community，” a position viewed as favoring Russia’s. However， Beijing has refrained from directly criticizing Ankara’s decision to shoot down the plane.
China also appears reluctant to embroil itself in the row between Saudi Arabia and Iran， as both are major sources of oil imports. Although Iran went from being China’s third-biggest source of oil imports in 2012 to the sixth-biggest in 2014 after the UN imposed sanctions against the country， Tehran remains an important source of fuel for Beijing. As economic sanctions are being lifted imminently according to the agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to end Iran’s strategic nuclear program， China is expected to increase imports of Iranian oil.
Due in part to the increasingly chaotic geopolitical situation in the Middle East， China has already begun to diversify its sources of oil imports， as oil-producing countries compete for the Chinese market.
Nevertheless， as long as China remains reluctant to become more deeply committed to its Middle Eastern partners in terms of security cooperation， the resources Beijing will likely be willing to invest in resolving regional conflicts will remain limited. As tensions escalate， particularly between Saudi Arabia and Iran， the chances of China’s newfound diplomatic activism making a major impact seem remote.