New Threats, New Strategies

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In the past year， the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region experienced a spate of violent attacks on law enforcement forces and civilians alike. Following several bloody attacks in April， June and August， a jeep carrying three Uyghurs plowed into tourists before crashing and catching fire in Beijing’s Tian’anmen Square， on October 28. Five tourists were killed， and 40 others injured.

The Turkistan Islamic Party， which the Chinese government claims is a splinter cell of the terrorist organization the East Turkestan Islamic Movement （ETIM）， later claimed responsibility for the attack.

More violence was to follow. In November， nine civilians and two police officers were killed in an attack on a police station near the city of Kashgar， followed by two similar attacks in December， the first leaving 14 civilians and two police officers dead， and the second， on another police station， causing eight more civilian casualties.

Then， on January 24， bombs exploded near a market in Toksu County， Aksu Prefecture， killing one local resident and two militants. Aksu County saw more violence on February 14， the night of the Chinese Lantern Festival， when two police officers and two locals were injured in an attack on a police patrol in Uqturpan that ended with eight suspected militants being shot dead.

Hard Line

On February 14， Zhang Chunxian， Party chief of Xinjiang， announced that the regional government would send 200，000 officials to work at the grassroots level over the next three years in a campaign aimed at improving “peo- ple’s livelihoods and regional stability.” The selection of officials， who will be sent to around 10，000 villages and communities following a “leave no gaps” approach， will be ready by March 5， local media reported.

The move follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s remarks to the Standing Committee of the Politburo in December 2013 regarding the governance of Xinjiang， which analysts believe marks a major strategic shift in Beijing’s official policy.

The Xinjiang Daily， official newspaper of the regional government of Xinjiang reported earlier in January that Xi laid out “guiding principles， major targets and tasks，” of the Xinjiang government during the meeting， though specific details were not revealed.

The Global Times， citing anonymous sources close to the leadership， claimed that the full text of Xi’s speech was only available for perusal by officials “at the regional level.” The Xinjiang Daily later quoted Zhang Chunxian， Party secretary of the region， as stating that the “primary task” in the region should be“maintaining social stability and an enduring peace.”

Earlier， in mid-2013， the central government had dispatched high-level inspection teams to Xinjiang， headed by Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu and Politburo Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng. Observers believe that the report on Xi’s speech suggests that the central leadership has reached a common understanding of the situation in this vast， ethnically diverse region.

With the establishment of the National Security Committee in late 2013， it was believed that the central government had taken direct control over Xinjiang’s internal security.

Past Lessons

Unrest in Xinjiang has persisted since ethnic riots in Atmo County south of Kashgar in April 1990 left eight police officers dead， and seven seriously injured. Official data show that throughout the 1990s， 250 armed riots and terrorist attacks occurred in the region， killing and injuring more than 600 police officers， government employees and local residents.

Starting in the late 1990s， the regional government under Wang Lequan， the former Party chief of Xinjiang， adopted an “iron fist”policy， enforcing a series of zero-tolerance measures that made social stability the regional government’s sole priority.

However， after periods of relative stability in the early 2000s， violence erupted once more in July 2008， just one month prior to the Beijing Olympics， when two Uyghur separatists bombed a police garrison in Kashgar， killing 16. Then， in July 2009， bloody ethnic riots erupted in Urumqi， in which 197 people， mostly Han Chinese as well as several Uy-ghurs， were killed， and more than 1，700 injured.

In the wake of the rioting， which many experts argued resulted from rising ethnic tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese as a consequence of Wang’s heavy-handed antiterror campaign， the situation continued to deteriorate. Other analysts claimed that the poverty of native Uyghurs， coupled with a massive influx of comparatively wealthy and more socially mobile Han migrants into the region， had created a tinderbox， particularly in urban areas.

In response， the central government under Hu Jintao began to adopt the mantra “development is the key，” stressing that reform and development were as vital to calming the situation as maintaining stability.

In 2010， Zhang Chunxian， a perceived moderate， replaced Wang Lequan to assume the top Party post in Xinjiang. Zhang launched various programs to promote economic development and improve the livelihoods of local Uyghurs， though counterterrorism measures remained firmly in place.

But with outbreaks of violence in 2012 and 2013， Zhang became criticized as a “soft touch.” While stressing the necessity of “maintaining stability and economic development，”the central leadership has increasingly emphasized the importance of “safeguarding people’s safety and property，” a swing back towards the emphasis on security， but with a nod to economic considerations.

But experts argue that the central government will go beyond these catch-all concepts to launch more comprehensive， specific and concrete measures in the realms of both socioeconomic policy and security.

According to Turgunjan Tursun， a research fellow at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences， instead of programs that aim to engender nonspecific economic growth， the government will develop projects oriented toward specific problems. For example， labor intensive industries are expected to be developed in southern Xinjiang to curb mass unemployment， seen by many as the cause of much of the region’s unrest.

Tursun argued that the recent move to send an unprecedented number of officials on the grassroots level is an effort to win support from local residents， especially from ethnic minority groups， in promoting Xinjiang’s development， while facilitating security enforcement.

Professor Zheng Shouhua， director of the Non-war Military Operations Research Center of the Academy of Military Sciences， told NewsChina that “stronger central leadership”will enable “better coordination and integration” between law enforcement agencies， including the police， the armed police and the military in terms of counterterrorism.

Global Perspective

Besides policy adjustment at the regional level， the central leadership’s assumption of direct control over Xinjiang policy also suggests a greater understanding of how unrest in the region is perceived globally.

Professor Li Wei， an expert on terrorism at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations， suggests the central government’s new thinking over the Xinjiang problem reflects a realization that terrorism in Xinjiang is shaped by a dynamic of transnational Islamic extremism.

According to Professor Li， the emergence of terrorism in Xinjiang in the 1990s occurred as a knock-on effect of the former Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1987 and its eventual collapse in 1991， which left a regional power vacuum that well-funded extremist Islamist organizations were able to fill.

As the former Soviet Union’s central Asian republics， including Kazakstan， Tajikistan， Turkmenistan， Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan， a region also known as West Turkestan， gained independence， this fostered the Islamic “East Turkestan” movement in Xinjiang.

Russia experienced similar unrest and upheaval in majority-Muslim Chechnya and Dagestan in the same period， and the West was fully awoken to the reality of Islamic fundamentalism by the September 11 attacks of 2001.

After Russia launched the Second Chechen War in 1999， and the US launched its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001， attacks in Xinjiang sharply declined， as China declared its wholehearted support for the global War on Terror.

However， the US withdrawal from Afghanistan， along with political turmoil in Iraq and armed conflicts in Syria， has once again left a power vacuum and a subsequent resurgence of Islamic extremism throughout the region. Xinjiang has not been immune from its effects.

According to Xing Guangcheng， director of the Institute of Russian， Eastern European， and Central Asian Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences， a major difference between more recent attacks and those in the 1990s is that they are now driven more by Islamic extremism than separatism.

“In the 1990s， flags captured in violent attacks were mostly the blue flags of ‘East Turkestan，’” Xing told NewsChina. “Today， these appear to have been exchanged for the black flags of jihadists.”

The resurgence of violent attacks in the region not only threatens Xinjiang’s internal security： they have now reached the heart of Beijing， with October’s car bombing a terrifying wake-up call for the central leadership. The Party now perceives that extremism in one of the country’s most restive areas could also jeopardize China’s so-called “westward strategy.”

In his first Central Asia tour made in September， 2013， President Xi Jinping launched his “New Silk Road” initiative， proposing to build an “a Silk Road economic belt” centered on China and encompassing its Central and South Asian as well as Middle Eastern neighbors.

Aimed to find new markets and new growth stimulus for China’s vast hinterland， the westward strategy is being used to address the imbalance of economic development between China’s coastal and inland provinces.

As part of this vision， China has tried to establish Kashgar as a Central Asian trading hub. But Kashgar， no stranger to bombings， knife attacks on citizens and ethnic riots， already risks becoming a rallying point for fundamentalist Islamism， scaring off investors， tourists and developers.

At the very least， an assertion of central control over Xinjiang is expected to guarantee better coordination when meeting the multiple and historic challenges faced by the Chinese authorities in managing the region.

As Professor Xing told our reporter： “Xinjiang’s stability is no longer a regional issue， but a national one， with global significance.”