Nuclear Test Fallout
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THE testing of a nuclear device on February 12， 2013 by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea （DPRK） has plunged the Korean Peninsula into crisis once more.
On that day， Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi urgently summoned the DPRK ambassador to China. Yang stated the Chinese government’s firm opposition to the DPRK’s third nuclear test and expressed extreme dissatisfaction with this act， which has disrupted peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
Wu Dawei， China’s Vice Foreign Minister and chief negotiator at the Six-Party Talks， stated that China would condemn the DPRK’s nuclear test “to the last.”
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons， longrange missiles and weapons of mass destruction generally represents the cornerstone of post Cold War global security.
The DPRK conducted its latest nuclear test in total disregard of common opposition from the international community， deepening the long-term diplomatic impasse that the North Korean nuclear issue has created， heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula and exacerbating what is already a fragile Northeast Asian order due to recent territorial disputes.
The DPRK’s domestic and foreign policies constitute an anomaly in Northeast Asian security.
Paradigm Shift
The Kim Jong Un administration conducted the nuclear test to endorse the new leader’s regime， to prove the legitimacy of the power Kim Jong Un inherited from his late father Kim Jong Il， and to force the international community to accept the fact that the DPRK is a nuclear-armed country.
As the world’s most closed and isolated country， the DPRK is distinct by virtue of its hereditary political power， bellicose and emotional foreign policy and historically difficult economic situation.
The DPRK media refers to nuclear weapons as one of the three biggest legacies of the late leader Kim Jong Il.
Kim Jong Un’s nuclear ambitions are aimed at proving to DPRK citizens his leadership ability， demonstrating to the world that the DPRK has absorbed the impact of the recent leadership transition， and counterbalancing the large conventional forces of the Republic of Korea （ROK）.
In April 2012， the Kim Jong Un government amended the country’s constitution to state explicitly that the DPRK is “a nuclear-armed country.”This makes clear that in the Kim Jong Un era the DPRK has openly abandoned its commitment to denuclearization and adopted confrontational policies intended to force the international community to accept it as a nuclear power.
On December 12， the DPRK launched a satellite in defiance of UN resolutions 1718 in 2006 and 1874 in 2009. On January 23， 2013 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 imposing additional sanctions against the DPRK， because the technology in a satellite launch vehicle is directly applicable to ballistic missile development.
The DPRK’s response to the international community’s call to denuclearize and halt programs for the development of weapons of mass destruction was to conduct a nuclear test.
The DPRK later announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks and stated its objections to bilateral or multilateral talks on its denuclearization.
It seems that the Kim Jong Un administration is heading towards its goals step by step. But in addition to putting the DPRK at risk， nor will these aims and actions bring any real benefit to the country.
China’s Role
As a Northeast Asian country， China steadfastly opposes the DPRK’s nuclear weapon programs.
China has contributed to promoting denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula through hosting the Six-Party Talks. In September 2005， the six parties signed a Joint Statement wherein the DPRK agreed to abandon its nuclear weapon programs in return for economic cooperation with the other five parties and the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan.
The DPRK’s third nuclear test is hence a violation of the Joint Statement， and also a heavy blow to China.
After the test， many media criticized China for its inability to effectively influence the DPRK， and even for “encouraging” it to “take a nuclear risk.”Such opinions are unfounded.
Since the second North Korea nuclear crisis broke out in October 2002， China has actively played the role of peace mediator in hopes of giving the DPRK some time and of encouraging it to emulate China’s reform and opening-up policy.
Upon the death of former DPRK leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011， China persuaded the United States and the ROK to engage the DPRK and also warned relevant countries not to disrupt the DPRK power transition.
China has unremittingly promoted dialogues and contacts between the United States and the DPRK. On February 29， the DPRK signed an agreement with the United States， agreeing to suspend long-range missile launches in return for food aid from the United States.
The agreement was breached， however， on April 12， 2012 with the DPRK’s launch of a satellite. When on April 16 the UN Security Council issued the Chairman’s statement condemning the DPRK for this act， China voted in support， expressing strong dissatisfaction with the DPRK’s flip-flop behavior.
In the post-Kim Jong Il era， Beijing’s DPRK policy mainly focuses on three aspects. First， it has encouraged the DPRK’s policy to develop economy， supported Kim Jong Un’s slogan that “bullets and rice are equally important” and pushed the DPRK to follow China’s reform and opening-up model. To achieve this， China has set up training bases in such northeastern cities as Changchun， Dalian， Shenyang and Dandong to train North Korean officials. Chinese entrepreneurs are also interested in doing business in the DPRK.
Second， China has promoted contacts and dialogues among the DPRK， the ROK and the United States while at the same time continuing to persuade the DPRK not to take any provocative actions such as conducting nuclear tests. China is thus able to exert influence on the DPRK by linking political and economic cooperation with the latter’s nonprovocative policies.
Third， China has monitored the US-Japan-ROK alliance’s policies toward the DPRK in the event that they might disrupt stability in the DPRK during and after the leadership transition.
On February 12， the DPRK challenged the international community by conducting a nuclear test. This suggests that it is difficult to separate the North Korea nuclear issue from the country’s other problems.
Unless the Kim Jong Un administration reforms its domestic institutions， abandons its long-held Seongun （military first） policy and emerges from isolation， it will be difficult to achieve any breakthrough in resolving the nuclear issue.
China alone is not able to make the DPRK reform. Efforts from other parties such as the United States， Japan， the ROK and Russia， are also needed.
Possible Solutions
Currently， the UN Security Council is discussing new sanctions against the DPRK as a means to prevent escalation of the DPRK nuclear threat. It is nevertheless doubtful that sanctions or pressure will effectively and rapidly resolve the North Korea nuclear issue.
The international community has been imposing sanctions and pressure on the DPRK for several decades， yet the security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains grave. China is willing to join the international community in punishing the DPRK for its intransigence. But the international community should also work with China in finding ways of engaging the DPRK and pushing it to change from within. This is the only way of solving the North Korea issue without direct military conflicts that endanger the stability and prosperity of Northeast Asia.
The DPRK’s domestic situation and Kim Jong Un’s domestic and foreign policies constitute the biggest uncertainties with respect to the Korean Peninsula.
To achieve the goal of rejuvenating its economy and opening to the world， the DPRK should carry out reforms to its domestic system and improve relations with the ROK， the United States and Japan.
Only after it has demonstrated sincere determination to abandon nuclear weapons can the DPRK’s negotiation and contacts with other countries be resumed and a constructive external environment created for its internal development.
The DPRK will only create more insecurity for itself by insisting on forcing the international community to accept its nuclear weapons through nuclear confrontation.
There are two possibilities for the DPRK’s future. One is that it might institute limited reform and opening-up while possessing nuclear weapons but continue to be isolated and pressured by the international community. Tension on the Korean Peninsula will hence persist.
The other possibility is that the DPRK， in the process of negotiating for denuclearization， will improve the international environment， speed up institutional reform and opening-up and bring about security and development.
In either case， denuclearization is most likely to be an outcome rather than a prerequisite of the DPRK’s reform.