The Power of Appraisal

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In the past months， a host of factors such as increased automobile usage， increased coal consumption due to cold weather and a low pressure zone over China’s northern and eastern regions combined to make China’s already appalling urban air pollution hit record highs week after week. In the face of a widespread public outcry， officials across the country reiterated their determination to curb air pollution. In many cities， leaders vowed to hold relevant officials accountable for failing to meet environmental protection targets. Many pledges have been made， and now the public is waiting for action.

‘Veto Items’

Yang Weize， Party secretary of Nanjing， the capital of Jiangsu Province， vowed to make carbon emissions targets a “paramount factor”in appraising the performance of local cadres. His pledge， following the example of Beijing officials， while probably attrctive to the ears of both his superiors and the public， is actually a continuation of the so-called “veto item” policy employed by governments at various levels in dealing with urgent crises.

By including an issue into the extant appraisal system for local government officials and identifying it as a “veto issue，” higher-level governments can essentially deflect responsibility onto lower-level governments. These governments are then expected to make the issue in question a priority in their work， as failure to meet an imposed target will cause overall performance to be deemed an abject failure， ruining the careers of local leaders.

The underlying logic to this common practice within the Party is that by singling out a hot-button issue， be it corruption， air pollution or GDP growth， as the sole yardstick by which official performance is evaluated， said officials will devote themselves to resolving this particular issue successfully， winning a PR boost in the process.

However， political analysts now argue that this simplistic approach has become counterproductive. Not only has it failed to solve the issues it was supposedly aimed at tackling， the single-minded pursuit of certain stats often breeds neglect and even corruption among officials in areas in which they are judged less harshly.

“‘Veto items’ were designed to push lowerlevel governments to do their jobs well on toppriority issues， but in reality， this policy has backfired，” Professor Wang Yukai， vice-director of the China Society for Administrative Reform， told NewsChina. “Not only have some local governments， under extreme pressure， had to fake their accomplishments， but many have chosen to bend laws and regulations to suit their own ends in their efforts to meet their targets.”

The most obvious example of this contradiction is social stability a priority for local governments in every Chinese province. In the past decade， as complaints and resentment among ordinary citizens over a variety of social problems have continued to mount， the State Council issued a 2001 decree making social stability an official veto item. While the decree’s wording encouraged officials to tackle problems such as protests over forced demolition， abuse of power by police and cadres and workers’ disputes by investigating the source of these grievances， many officials instead chose to resort to heavy-handed tactics and brute force to suppress dissent.

Under the terms laid out by the State Council， official evaluations begin by examining how many petitions and official complaints have been filed in a local government jurisdiction. Should this number be judged to be unaccept- ably high， the local leaders in question will likely be passed over for promotion essentially meaning the end of their political careers.

While the central government may have hoped to press local governments to sincerely address the grievances of ordinary citizens， their policy instead kick-started a trend of “interception” of petitioners en route to Beijing and provincial capitals， with a whole network of socalled “black jails” set up in the suburbs of the capital to illegally detain legal petitioners （see：“Halfway House of Horrors，” NewsChina， February 2013）.

In the years following the creation of the veto item policy， the State Council further identified enforcement of the One Child Policy （2006）， environmental protection regulations （2005） and carbon emissions reduction targets （2007） as veto items when evaluating officials from the provincial level downward. Yet as with the social stability criteria， officials became adept at fudging statistics and covering up abuses rather than genuinely tackling these issues in the manner intended. In the case of One Child Policy in particular， cases continually come to light exposing the ongoing practice of forced abortions， illegal under Chinese law， as a means to meet birth control targets.

With less tangible targets， such as environmental protection， faking data has become a common practice for officials aiming to meet GDP growth requirements without attracting attention for environmental degradation. Until late 2012， officials in China’s biggest cities， including Beijing and Shanghai， refused to acknowledge the globally accepted measurement of the PM 2.5 （particles 2.5 micrometers in diameter） content of the air when monitoring air quality. Official air quality readings began to fall so far short of independent analysts’ findings that they became a laughing stock.

In Shanxi， a coal-rich province which also has one of the world’s highest coal mine death tolls， officials have repeatedly been exposed covering up deadly pit collapses and gas explosions simply to avoid being penalized for failing to meet centrally-imposed safety targets. Few mining operations have chosen the far more expensive route of genuinely trying to improve worker safety.

Accountable to Whom？

Apart from the four veto items officially identified by the State Council， provincial governments and prefecture-level governments have followed the top leadership’s example by formulating their own lists of non-negotiable targets and imposing them on their subordinates.

In Jiangxi Province， for example， 62 “imperative tasks” have been set for all sub-provincial government departments， ranging from preventing “deaths during detention” （which are widely attributed to torture） to attracting foreign direct investment， protecting wetland habitats and even confiscating forged invoices. Often， the penalties for failing to meet these targets are far more harsh than the penalties for bending laws and regulations in order to deliver results.

“Almost all departments are now striving to have their line of work identified as a veto item by their respective Party committee， as it would make it easier for them to do their jobs，” Li Jiancang， an official from Guangzhou’s Yuexiu District， told NewsChina.

According to Professor Liu Xutao with the China National School of Administration， the result is that grassroots-level governments， possessing the least resources and the least power， bear the most responsibility for enforcing centrally or provincially-imposed targets. These targets often fail to take local circumstances into consideration.

“With so many higher-level agencies and governments holding veto power over them， grassroots officials cannot afford to offend anyone， and instead have to go about fulfilling ‘imperative’ tasks imposed on them by authorities in all sorts of fields，” Liu told NewsChina. In contrast， by shunting pressure downhill， higher-level government agencies， possessing more resources and more power， are able to neatly pass the buck when an urgent issue lands on their desks.

Moreover， with so many social problems being identified as “priorities” but the allocation of resources fairly stagnant， few lower-level governments are in a position to take priority items as seriously as their superiors demand. This may explain why eight years after environmental protection was made a top priority by the central government， air pollution in major cities has actually worsened.

“The fundamental problem of these so-called ‘veto item’ system is that they make local officials accountable to higher-level officials， instead of to local residents，” Liu Xutao told our reporter. Liu believes that China’s current appraisal system， a legacy of the Mao-era command economy， has become obsolete in the 21st century. “It is built on a system that follows the principle of ‘rule by power，’which often conflicts with the principle of rule of law.”

Liu pointed out that the National People’s Congress enacted the Population and Family Planning Law in 2002， and that this law has the highest authority over any issue to do with the One Child Policy. But when the State Council issued a decree on family planning policy in 2005， it trumped this law by default.

A similar problem is also found in the governments’ approach to addressing social grievances. By pressing local governments to curb， rather than address， local complaints， the central government fails to acknowledge a major source of such complaints the absence of genuine rule of law. When local governments resort to unlawful means to deal with petitioners， it further undermines the authority of the Chinese legal system， whose courts remain essentially subordinate to the Party. This， in turn， leads to more complaints and ever more violent clashes between the public and the authorities.

Moreover， many legal activists in China have questioned the legality of the veto item policy itself. Despite its widespread adoption， the power to declare veto items appears to rest with just about any government department so long as it has a subordinate department it can impose these items upon. More often than not， a veto item is simply an arbitrary criterion imposed on a local government or agency by a higher-up， with the higher-up in turn likely frustrated by their own superiors’ imposition of seemingly arbitrary criteria upon them.

“A sound appraisal system for officials should make them accountable to the people，” said Liu.“The government should reform the existing system and hand over the power to appraise official performance to society.”